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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MONROE CITY, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES L. ARNOLD, NORRIS K. 
ARNOLD, and JON R. ARNOLD, 
d/b/a ARNOLD HOG RANCH, 
Defendants and Appellants. j 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
11,300 
Action brought by a third class city to restrain and abate 
operation of a commercial piggery within the city limits and 
within a r,esidential area as a public nuisance. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
District Court found the operation by the Defendants of 
a commercial piggery within a residential area of Monroe 
City to be a nuisanc.e and ordered the operation abated and 
restrained. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, Respondent here, seeks to have affirmed the 
judgment and order of the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was filed by the Plaintiff in its capacity as a 
third class city of the State of Utah to enjoin the operation 
of a commercial piggery within the riesidential area of Mon-
roe City. The piggery is operated on approximately two and 
one half city lots, one block from main stre,et (T. 24, Line 
9) 1, and located in a residential area (T. 19, Line 2). Up to 
250 hogs are kept on the premis,es by the Defendants at one 
time and in the calendar year of 1966 the Defendants sold 
253 pigs for market (T. 124, Line 21). The operation is com-
mercial and "to make money" (T. 99, Line 14). The size of 
the piggery was incf\eased substantially over a period of 
three years prior to the filing of the complaint. It was ex· 
plained that the operation was expanded to provide the com-
plete support for Charles L. Arnold after he had left other 
employment (T. 8, Line 28). 
The Defendants maintain a complete hog breeding and 
feeding operation. The operation requires them to clean 
pig pens and pile manure for some periods of time (T. 7, 
Line through 4). In winter months the manure is piled 
until spring when it can be taken out and put on a patch of 
alfalfa which is on the same two and one half city lots (T. 
102, Line 23). The operation requires the Defendants to 
take measures to kill and collect dead flies by the wheelbar-
row load (T. 12, Line 16, T. 18, Line 16, through 21). The 
flies, together with the afterbirth taken from the farrowing 
pigs and the smaller dead pigs and other refus.e is stored and 
burned in a large barrel on the lot (T. 9, Line 7 through 16; 
T. 9, Line 26 through 30; T. 12, Line 16; T. 18, Line 16 
through 21). The hog farrowing pens used by the sows 
hav.e cement floors which are washed down periodically and 
all of the manure, urine, and other debris is soaked down 
and washed from the pens on to the lot (T. 22, Line 11; T. 
23, Line 3 through 6). 
1Citations are to R,eporter's Transcript pages. 
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Witnesses in the residential area describe the odors com-
ing from the piggery as obnoxious and nauseating. Neigh-
bors testified that it made it impossible for them to go out 
doors for any length of time and the condition is exceed-
ingly embarrassing for them on occasions when friends or 
relatives visit their homes (T. 27, Line 15 through 24; T. 28, 
Line 8; T. 30, Line 9; T. 39, Line 20; T. 54, Line 7 through 
9; T. 54, Line 27 through 28, and etc.). Neighbors testified 
that the noise. from the piggery and from the squealing 
hogs caused them to be awakened several times each night 
(T. 28, Line 21; T. 47, Line 22 through 30). The manure, 
and on some occasions dead pigs buried in the manur.e pile, 
was offensive to sight (T. 31, Line 5 through 12). 
The Defendant Charles L. Arnold was called as the first 
witness and examined. He acknowledged the commercial 
nature of the piggery and admitted that it was solely for his 
support (T. 8, Line 28); that the piggery operation had in-
creased substantially over the past thr.ee years (T. 8, Line 
9 through 30). He also stated that he was the sole operator 
and in charge of running the complete operation (T. 13, 
Line 24 through 27). On cross examination, Counsel for the 
D.ef.endant offered Defendant's Exhibit "A", a Warranty 
Deed, showing the conveyance of the property from Charles 
L. Arnold to his sons, Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold. 
Objection was made to the immateriality of the .exhibit (T. 
13, Line 12 through 30). Counsel for Defendant then rais.ed 
the question of "who was the real party in interest" (T. 14, 
Line 4 through 15). The objection to the exhibit was sus-
tained and Mr. Barkier made a proffer of proof (T. 15, Line 
19). He stated that the property had been transferred to 
the sons in the year of 1967, the year of the filing of the 
complaint. The Court took a r,ecess and discuss.ed the mat-
ter with counsel in Chambers. It was acknowledged by Mr. 
Barker, Attorney for the Defendants, a n d by Defendant, 
Norris K. Arnold, that he had been employ1ed by Norri·s K. 
Arnold and Jon R. Arnold to def.end the matter (T. 135, Line 
19 through 28). It was also acknowledged in Chambers by 
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Mr. Barker that his defense would be substantially the same 
if the additional parties were joined and that his prepara-
tion and exhibits would be the same (Findings of Fact No. 
2 and 3). Upon motion of the Plaintiff, the Court ordered 
Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold added as Defendants in 
their partnership capacity as Arnold Hog Ranch. Both De-
fendants were present in Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MONROE CITY HAS THE POWER AND OBLIGATION 
TO ABATE OR ENJOIN A NUISANCE. 
Monroe City is a city of third class in the State of Utah. 
It derives its powers as a subdivision of the State of Utah 
by specific legislative enactment. The legislature has ad-
opted the following two statutes which have granted Mon-
roe City the power to abate a nuisance: 
"Section 10-8-60, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and 
abate the same, and impose fines upon persons who 
may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. 
Section 10-8--67, Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
Pigsties, privies-Prohibiting ,establishment. They 
may prohibit any offensive, unwholesome business 
or establishment in and within one mile of the limits 
of the corporation, compel the owner of any pigsty, 
privy, barn, corral, sewer, or other unwholesome or 
nauseous house or place to cleanse, abate or remove 
the same, and may regulat.e the location ther,eof ." 
The foregoing ,emphasis by underlining has been added 
by us. 
The general rule concerning whether a municipal corpora-
tion may be a party plaintiff seeking injunctive relief has 
been stated in Section 281, Municipal Corporations, in Vol-
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ume 62 of Corpus Juris Secundum, at Page 632. It is as 
follows: 
"As a g,eneral rule a m u n i c i p a l corporation may 
maintain an equitable action or a proceedings in the 
nature thereof to aid in compelling the abatement of 
a nuisance. A municipality may sue in equity to 
compel the abatement of a nuisance affecting mat-
ters confided to it in its governmental capacity al-
though it has suffe1:1ed no special damages therefor 
and equitable relief may also be obtained in the 
name of the municipal corporation because of spe-
cial injury, either to property owned by the corpora-
tion or to property to which it stands in a trust rela-
tion for the benefit of the public." 
It is clearly apparent from the cited legislation found in 
Title 10 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953, that municipalities 
of the state are giv,en the obligation and authority to take 
some action to regulate nuisances and also to "abate the 
same". A city has the alternative of providing by ordin-
ance a system of regulation and fines in criminal proceed-
ings. It also has the right to seek the powers of a court for 
a mor.e complete relief2. 
The need for equitable relief in the present case is clear. 
The City could proceed against one or more of the Defon-
dants and charge them with maintaining a nuisance and im-
2CJS. Injunctions, Sec. 124, Vol. 43, p. 671: 
"Acts which are a menaoe to the public health or safety, or, 
as sometimes stated in greater detail, acts which are dan-
gerous to human life, detrimental to public health, and the 
occasion of great public inconvenience and damage, may be 
enjoined. The power to issue an injunction in these circum-
stances belongs to the general powers poss.essed by courts 
of equity, and is also conferred by some statutes applicable 
to various situations or matters, and a municipality is auth-
orized to sue for an injunction to prevent or restrain the 
violation of municipal polioe and sanitary regulations by a 
constitutional provision authorizing municipalities to en-
force such regulations. 
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pose a fine on them. This relief would be temporary and 
possibly arbitrary. The City is in need of an adjudication 
as to whether or not the condition complained of is a nuis-
ance and also an injunction which will reHeve the inhabi-
tants of the problem. 
In an action brought in the State of California for injunc-
tive relief against the keeping of 5 hogs as a public nuis-
ance, P.eople vs. Johnson, 277 P2d 45, the Court reaffirmed 
the language in the cas.e of the City of Stockton vs. Frisbey 
and Latta, 93 C. A. 277, 270 P 270, it was held that where 
the personal welfare and property rights of a large number 
of the inhabitants of a city or town would be detrimentally 
affected by the violation of a police or sanitary r·egulation, 
whether the ordinance provides other means for its enforce-
ment or not, such city or town may itself appeal to a court 
of equity by means of the forceful and singularly effective 
Writ of Injunction to restrain such violation or to cause the 
wrongful effect thereof to be removed. 
We believe the reasoning of the California cases cited as 
well as cases from many other jurisdictions where cities 
have brought actions to enjoin a nuisance is not only per-
suasive but controlling. Some additional cases from other 
jurisdictions where cities hav,e maintained actions for in-
junctive relief are: Colorado-Echove vs. Grants Junction, 
193 P2d 277; Kansas City Br,ewery vs. Kansas City, 193 P 
523; New Mexico-Town of Gallop vs. Constant, 11 P2d 962. 
The evidence appears to be overwhelming and undisputed 
that the piggery maintained by the Arnold Hog Ranch per-
sonnel does constitute a public nuisance. It affects residents 
of Monroe City for a considerable distance from the hog 
ranch. In addition, it affects and is riepulsive to persons 
traveling or walking on public streets near the piggery. The 
stench coming f r o m the hog farm was characterized as 
"sour", "nauseating", "terrible", "sickening", and on occa-
sions so bad that it was impossible to get out of doors in 
ar.eas near the piggery. 
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Utah Statutes define a public nuisance. Although the 
statutes are criminal in natur.e, they do set a minimum 
standard which has been imposed by the Utah Legislature 
for the conduct of persons within the state. They are applic-
able here and in the same manner violations of the motor 
vehicles are applicable to show that a motorist has breached 
the standard of duty he owes to the public when a violation 
of one of the statutes is found. 
Under Section 78.-38-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, -
"Nuisance" Defined - Right of Action for - Judgment: 
"Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, 
or offensive to the senses. or an obstruction to the 
free use of property, so as to interf.ere with the com-
fortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance 
and the subject of an action. Such action may be 
brought by any person whose property is injuriously 
affected, or whose p,ersonal enjoyment is lessened by 
nuisance; and by the judgment the nuisance may be 
enjoined or abated, and damages may also be recov-
ered." (emphasis added). 
It is s,een that a right of action is granted against any 
person who maintains a condition which is in j u r i o u s to 
health, or indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstruc-
tion to the free use of property. 
The offense complained of against the Arnold piggery 
dearly falls within this definition. It is classified as a nuis-
ance which the city has an obligation to abate or prohibit. 
The legislatur.e then has enacted Section 76-43-3, "Public 
Nuisance'' defined: 
"A public nuisance is a crime against the order and 
economy of the state, and consists in lawfully doing 
any act, or omitting to perform any duty, which act 
or omission either: 
(1) Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, re-
pose, health, or saf,ety of three or more persons ; or 
(2) Offends public decency; or 
7 
(3) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs or tends 
to obstruct, or renders dangerous for passage, any 
lake, stream, canal or basin, or any public park, 
square, street or highway; or 
( 4) In any way rienders three or more persons inse-
cure in life or the use of property." 
We think no additional argument is needed concerning 
the definition of public nuisance since the statutes cited 
g.enerally follow the common law and citations from cases 
from other jurisdictions concerning common law nuisances 
would not be helpful to the Court. An informative annota-
tion is found under title "Nuisance-Keeping Pigs" in 2 
ALR3d 933. Some of the cases cited have found keeping of 
pigs in a city to he a nuisance per se. 
POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY ADDED ADDITIONAL 
PARTIES DURING THE COURSE OF TRIAL. 
The complaint of the Plaintiff was filed against Charles 
L. Arnold charging him with maintaining a public nuisance 
and seeking an injunction against its continued operation. 
He was called as Plaintiff's first witness. He testified that 
he had lived on the property w her :e the piggery is main-
tained for forty years (T. 5, Line 5); that he had been rais-
ing some pigs on the property for 26 or 27 years; that his 
operation had incfleased over the past f.ew years over what 
it had been at earlier times (T. 5, Line 9 through 17); that 
the operation was also solely for his benefit and "therie is 
nobody else benefits by it whatsoever, only me" (T. 8, Line 
28). Upon cross examination, Mr. Baker attempted to iden-
tify Defendant's proposed Exhibit "A", which was a War-
ranty Deed dated in the y:ear 1967, conveying Htle to the 
real property upon which the piggery is operated, to his 
sons Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold. An objection to 
the proposed exhibit was sustained on grounds that it was 
not material (T. 14). 
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Mr. Barker then made a proffer of proof that the Defen-
dants Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold were in fact the 
operators of the piggery, and that they were the real parties 
in interest. Thereupon the. Court recess,ed the matter for 
five minutes and requested that Counsel consult with him in 
Chambers. Since the matter of parties had not been specif-
ically raised, the. Court discussed with Counsel the following 
items: (1) If the two sons who claim to be in a partnership 
and actually operate the piggery were present in Court. Mr. 
Barker informed the Court they were. (2) If the two sons 
had employed the services of Mr. Barker and assisted in the 
defense. Mr. Barker informed the Court that this was the 
case. (3) Whether Mr. Barker's defense w o u 1 d be the 
same or substantially the same and the witnesses would be 
the same if the two Def end ants were in the case. Mr. Bar-
ker answered this question in the affirmative. The Court's 
attention is invited to Findings of Fact No. 2 and 3, to 
which no obj,ection has been taken. 
The Court reconv,ened and a motion was made to join De-
fendants Norris K. Arnold and Jon R. Arnold as additional 
parties. Mr. Barker objected to any joinder at this stage in 
the proceedings (T. 16, Line 21). The Court requested that 
Mr. Barker show him wher,eby he would be prejudiced (T. 
lG, Line 26). Mr. Barker offered no showing that his 
clients would be prejudiced in any manner and requested 
only that his objection be noted. Thereupon, the motion to 
join the additional parttes was grant e d (T. 17, Line 1 
through 15). In the proceedings Norris K. Arnold, one of 
the added Defendants, testified that he and his brother, Jon 
R. Arnold, were the ones who engaged couns,el to defend the 
action (T. 135, Line 23 through 25), and also that he had 
be.en contacted as soon as the complaint had been served 
(T. 15, Line 27). He acknowledged assisting the pr.epara-
tion of the exhibits which were introduced or attempted to 
be introduced, (T. 97 and 98). He and presumably his 
brother, Jon, had visited various spots in Monroe. City and 
taken pictures of all of them in preparing the defense to be 
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asserted and introduced in proposed Exhibit "F" (T. 98, 
Line 9). 
The Defendants wer.e not prejudiced by the order joining 
additional parties. The very purpose of Rule 21, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure was served and all of the issues w ere 
clearly befo:r:e the Court. 
It is seen that the added Defendants personally appeared 
in the action and took part in the proceedings after t he 
Court had ruled that they were to be added as a party. In 
this manner they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The permitted joinder of the additional partiies 
allowed the Defendants to introduce into evidence the War-
ranty Deed covering the property involved; the income tax 
returns for prior Y1ears showing the investment which was 
made in the property by the added Defendants. If the Court 
had refused to join the additional parties, these items would 
have been immaterial and the Defendant Chades L. Arnold 
would have been prohibited from showing any investment in 
the property or resulting damage to him if the Court en-
joined him from maintaining a public nuisance and enter1ed 
an order requiring him to abate it. However, the added De-
fendants voluntarily continued with the cause and argued 
to the Court that their investment should be considered to 
mitigate a permanent injunction. 
Objection has been made to the jurisdiction of the Court 
over the added Defendants. Summons and complaint were 
not served upon the added Defendants but they were joined 
by amendment at the time of trial. There may have been 
some basis for the Defendants' argument had the added De-
fendants then not proceeded with the def.ens.e thereby sub-
mitting to the jurisdiction of the Court. The only possible 
prejudice which could have come to the added Defendants 
would have been the possibility of lack of time to prepare a 
defense. This was not asserted at any time and was in fact 
negatived by the defense which was presented at the hear-
ing. No request was .ever made for a continuance for this 
purpose. 
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The granting of a motion to bring in additional parties to 
an action is not a matter of right but rather one of discre-
tion and the order should not be disturbed unless abuse of 
discretion is shown. 3 
POINT III 
ABATEMENT OF THE HOG RANCH AND AN 
INJUNCTION AGAINST ITS OPERATION WAS 
AN AUTHORIZED AND NEEDED REMEDY. 
We agree that injunctive relief is proper only to restrain 
the inflicting of substantial, serious and irreparable dam-
ages, and where there is no adequate remedy at law. 
The facts of this cas,e dramatize the need for that injunc-
tion. All of the testimony show that the relief granted by 
the District Court was the only practical solution to the 
problem of the inhabitants of Monroe City. The condition 
created and maintained by the Def,endants was causing the 
neighbors in the residential area serious losses of the use of 
their own properties. 
The odors wer1e described as sour-sickening, nauseating 
and embarrassing (T. 87; 27-30; 39; 54; 62; 77; and 79). 
Travelers passing on city str·eets adjacent to the hog ranch 
were r.equired to roll up their windows. Residents could not 
enjoy their homes and it became impossibl,e to use their 
yards for recveational purposes and particularly for eating 
or picnicking. One young girl found it exceedingly embar-
rassing if she had boyfriends call at her home (T. 72). The 
nois.e prev,ented some neighbors from sleeping at night and 
the residents were exposed to constant health hazards from 
flies and dead animals. The sight of the manure piles, dead 
pigs, burning of flies and afterbirth w,ere r.epulsive to the 
sense of sight. 
3Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 
Vol. 2, Page 223 
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A review of these facts leave only one practical solution 
and that solution was reached by the District Court. 
The Defendants attempted to hav1e admitted evidence con-
erning oher conditions in Monroe City which may hav1e con-
stituted a nuisance. 
The District Court correctly excluded that evidence and 
particularly part of Exhibit "E" and the ~explanation thereof 
and the slide photographs and Exhibit "F" with a holding 
that the possibility of other nuisances existing in Monroe 
City would not excuse and authorize the Defendants to con-
tinue a nuisance.1 
No foundation was laid to show that any of the odors, 
sights or sounds could have been coming from the areas 
proposed to be shown to the Court from the slides contained 
in Exhibit "F". No foundation was offered to connect the 
location sought to be shown to the problem before the Court. 
The evidence was overwhelming that the nuisance complain-
ed of was extreme and could not be tolerated in any setting. 
The Defendants argue that the injunction order of the 
Court is too harsh and that the Court should hav.e consid-
el'led some other remedy w hi c h would in fact reduce the 
nuisance.. This matter was argued before the Court and I 
am certain considered. The Court's view of the premises 
and consideration of the facts appeared to leave only one 
practical solution. It was shown that the sanitary method 
proposed by the Defendants of adding additional cement 
flooring in an entir.e corral was considered when the Court 
observ,ed that the farrowing pens are now covered w i th 
cement. The cement actually contributes to and inc~eases 
the obnoxious condition rather than abates it. Urine is able 
1See Ludlow et al. vs. Colo. Animal By-Products Co., 104 U 
22; 137 P2d 347. Mere fact that condition may already 
exist which may be obnoxious to some persons does not 
create a lioense for establishment of other more offensive 
conditions. 
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to accumulate on the cement and is requir.ed to evaporate 
rather than be taken into the soil or into a gravel surface. 
The manure and other accumulation are then required to be 
washed periodically. The water soaks up the material and 
washes it on to ground adjacent to the cement floor (T. 22, 
23). It would be reasonable to find that the cemented cond-
ition actually increases the nuisance problem, although it 
may have some saluatory ;effects so far as hog raising is 
concerned. 
The District Judge has had before him income tax returns 
and depreciation schedules which showed the investment 
and operation of the Defendants. He heard the testimony 
of Norris K. Arnold that the total investment of the Def en-
dants was approximately $20,000.00 in the pig breeding 
operation. He observed that the majority of the invest-
ment was in pigs and b!'leeding stock which could be readily 
moved. An additional portion of the inv.estment was also 
in chattels which could be readily moved. The financial loss, 
if any results, to the Defendants for moving the hogs would 
be nominal compared to the damag.e being caused daily to 
residents of Monroe City. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the judgment and order of the 
trial Court should be affirmed on appeal. 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
By Tex R. Olsen 
Attorney for Respondent 
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